Speech reports: Day 5
Hearsay evidentials & Class summary

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Hearsay evidentiality and (non–)commitment

Overarching issues

- Speech reports
- Division of labor between semantics and pragmatics
- Cross-linguistic variation and semantic variation

Evidentiality (Chafe and Nichols 1986; Aikhenvald 2004)

Linguistic category that signals the source of the semantically determined information for an utterance

Empirical landscape

English: lexical means, e.g. *seem, must* or adverbials

(1)   Threatened by climate change, Florida **reportedly** bans term
      'climate change'.   *Washington Post*

Many other languages: dedicated grammatical means to talk
about information source (verbal morphology, clitics …):

Direct	Indirect	
	INFERENCE	HEARSAY
• visual	• reasoning	• secondhand
• auditory	• observable results	• thirdhand
• other sensory		• folklore

(Willett (1988) based on a 32-language sample)

Empirical landscape, cont'd

(2) Cuzco Quechua (Quechuan; Peru)

    a.   para–sha–n=**mi**   [Firsthand]
             rain–PROG–3=**DIR**
             'It is raining, *I see*.'

    b.   para–sha–n=**si**   [Hearsay]
             rain–PROG–3=**REP**
             'It is raining, *I hear*.'

    c.   para–sha–n=**chá**   [Conjecture]
             rain–PROG–3=**CONJ**
             'It must be raining, *I gather*.'

                                 (adapted from Faller 2002: 3)

Empirical landscape cont'd

Evidential perfects (term due to Izvorski 1997)
- (Present) perfect morphology: hearsay and inference
- Especially common in the Anatolia–Balkans–Caucasus region

(3)   Georgian (South Caucasian; Georgia, Azerbaijan)
      C1: My brother tells me that the dragon hid the treasure. [HEARSAY]
      C2:The dragon's cave is empty.   [INFERENCE]

      urtʃxul-s   ganʤ-i   **daumalia**
      dragon-DAT   treasure-NOM   hide.3SG.S.3SG.O.**IND.PST**
      'The dragon hid the treasure, *I hear/infer*.'

Empirical landscape cont'd

237 out of 414 languages in (de Haan 2013b,a):
dedicated grammatical means to talk about information source

World Atlas of Language Structures (WALS) Online (`https://wals.info/`)

Uniformity and heterogeneity

- Evidentials exhibit semantic uniformity across a range of environments and can be analyzed as self-ascriptions of a mental state (Korotkova 2016a,b, 2019b)
  - ▸ speaker-oriented in root declaratives
  - ▸ resist denials in dialogues
  - ▸ *de se* in attitudes
  - ▸ addressee-oriented readings in canonical questions
- Some existing variation is syntactic (Korotkova forth.)
- Today: a case of non-syntactic variation
  - ▸ A systematic difference in the speaker's commitment to *p*
  - ▸ Commitment is used in a theory-neutral way

Non-commitment I

- Evidentials differ in commitment to p
  - Non-hearsay (direct, inference): commitment to at least $\Diamond p$ (see (Degen et al. 2019) on degrees of confidence)
  - Hearsay: often allow non-commitment

- Presence or absence of commitment is diagnosed by the possibility of explicit contradictions

Non–hearsay evidentials

Obligatory commitment at least $\Diamond p$: Bulgarian, Cheyenne, Georgian, Korean, St'át'imcets, Quechua, Turkish …

(4) Cuzco Quechua

    a.   FIRSTHAND

        #Para-sha-n-**mi**, ichaqa mana crei-ni-chu.
        rain-PROG-3-**DIR** but   not   believe-1-NEG
        Intended: 'It is raining, **I see**, but I don't believe it.'

    b.   CONJECTURE

        #Llave-qa muchila-y-pi-**chá**   ka-sha-n, ichaqa mana-**n**
        key-top   backpack-1-LOC-**CONJ** be-PROG-3 but   not-**DIR**
        aqhay-pi-chu.
        there-LOC-NEG
        Intended: 'The keys **may** be in my backpack, but they are not there.'
          (adapted from Faller 2002: 163, ex. 126 and 178, ex. 138)

(5) Georgian
Inference: You misattributed Maria's allergic red eyes to crying.

#maria-s **utiria**   magram asi ar   aris
Maria-DAT cry.3SG.S.**IND.PST** but   this NEG be.3SG.S.PRES
Intended: 'Maria was crying, **I infer**, but that is not so.'

Hearsay evidentials

Commitment often optional: first noticed for Cuzco Quechua, later observed in e.g. Bulgarian, Cheyenne, Georgian, Dutch, Tagalog (see (AnderBois 2014) for an extensive overview)

(6) Cuzco Quechua

Pay-kuna=**s**   ñoqa-man-qa   qulqi-ta   muntu-ntin-pi
(s)he-PL=**REP**   I-ILLA-TOP   money-ACC   lot-INCL-LOC

saqiy-wa-n, mana-má riki riku-sqa-yki ni   un   sol-ta
leave-1O-3   not-SURP right see-PP-2   not one sol-ACC

centavo-ta-pis saqi-sha-wa-n-chu
cent-ACC-ADD   leave-PROG-1O-3-NEG

'They left me a lot of money, ***as it is said***, but, as you have seen, they didn't leave me one sol, not one cent.'

(Faller 2002: 191, ex.152)

(7)   Georgian
        Hearsay: There is a report that California legalized marijuana.

kalifornia–s   k'anonier–i   **gauxdia**   marihuan–is
California–DAT   legal–NOM   make.**IND.PST** marijuana–GEN

gamoq'eneba magram asi   ar   aris
usage.NOM   but   this NEG   be.3SG.S.PRES

'California legalized marijuana, *I hear*, but that's not true.'

Non-commitment VI

Hearsay evidentials

Commitment can be obligatory: Finnish (pace AnderBois 2014), Gitksan, Lillooet Salish, Turkish (pace Şener 2011)

(8) Turkish (Turkic; Turkey): hearsay/inference miş
     Context: You hear from a friend that in snowed in LA, but you have reasons to be skeptical.

   #LA'ye kar   yağ-**mış** ama kar   yağ-dıg-ın-a
   LA.DAT snow rain-**IND** but snow rain-NMLZ-3SG.POSS-DAT
   inan-mı-yor-um.
   believe-NEG-PROG-1SG
   Intended: 'It snowed in LA, I hear, but I don't believe that it snowed.'
   Comment: to avoid being contradictory, use *guya* 'allegedly'.

Non-commitment VII

- Emerging typology

	HEARSAY	NON-HEARSAY
OPTIONAL COMMITMENT	✓	☹
OBLIGATORY COMMITMENT	✓	✓

- Desiderata for a theory
    1. account for optional commitment with hearsay (Bulgarian, Cheyenne, Dutch, Quechua, Tagalog ...)
    2. allow obligatory commitment with hearsay (Finnish, Gitksan, Lillooet Salish, Turkish)
    3. explain the systematic gap: only obligatory commitment with non-hearsay

Hearsay as a speech report

- Opacity

(9) German
Hans: The dean is on vacation.

Regine **soll** im Urlaub sein.
Regine **REP.3SG** in vacation be.INF
'Regine is said to be on vacation.'

- The source of report with hearsay evidentials needn't be sentient but requires linguistic communication:

(10) *Context: You read an encyclopedia.*

Kaliforniya'da balina var-**mış** TURKISH
California.LOC whale COP-**IND**
'There are whales in California, **I hear**.'

Accounts

- Special speech act
- Pragmatic shift
- Relevance implicature

- Speech acts with hearsay evidentials are special (Faller 2002; Portner 2006; Murray 2010, 2014, 2017)
- (Non-)commitment is an arbitrary fact of grammar

Special speech acts II

- Murray's system (Murray 2010, 2014, 2017)
- Some evidentials assert p
  - ▸ introduction of a discourse referent for p
  - ▸ proposal to add p to the common ground
  - ▸ reduction of the common ground to p–worlds
- Some evidentials present p
  - ▸ introduction of a discourse referent for p
  - ▸ common ground not reduced to p–worlds, contradictions possible
- A straightforward account of other phenomena under the "hegde" umbrella (cf. Simons 2007, Benton and von Elswyk forth)

(11)   My wife won't let me race real cars so I come here.
       It's an addiction **I suppose**.
                          (Corpus of Contemporary American English)

Special speech acts III

1. account for optional commitment with hearsay   ✓
2. allow obligatory commitment with hearsay   ✓
3. explain the systematic gap   ☹

→ nothing excludes a non-committal inference/direct evidential (cf. criticism in (AnderBois 2014))

Special speech acts IV

- Additional problems: embedded clauses
- Speech act accounts predict that the pattern evaporates (like norms of assertion; Yalcin cf. 2007 on epistemics)

(12) Dutch

Lisa	zegt	[dat	John	de	wijn	**shjint**	te	hebben
Lisa	say.3SG	[COMP	John	DEF	wine	**seem.3SG**	INF	AUX

opgedronken,] maar ze gelooft het niet.
drink.PART] but she believe.3SG that NEG
'Lisa said that John is said to have drunk all the wine, but she does not believe it.'

(13)   Turkish
       *Context: your friend Lisa woke up to white stuff on the ground
       and tells you about it.*

       #Lisa [LA'ye   kar   yağ-**mış**] de-di   ama   kar
       Lisa [LA.DAT   snow   rain-**IND**] say-PST but   snow
       yağ-dıg-ın-a   inan-mı-yor.
       rain-NMLZ-3SG.POSS-DAT   believe-NEG-PROG
       Intended: 'Lisa says that it snowed in LA, given what she inferred,
       but she doesn't believe that it snowed.'

Pragmatic shift I

- Non-commitment: result of a pragmatic shift (AnderBois 2014)
- Cf. a pragmatic account of perspective in (Harris and Potts 2009)
  - ▶ speaker-oriented by default (Potts 2007)
  - ▶ can shift to a salient perspective (Harris and Potts 2009)
- Only hearsay evidentials introduce another perspective
  - ▶ Commitment shifts to that of the reporter (cf. Smirnova 2012)
  - ▶ No such thing with non-hearsay

Pragmatic shift II

- Problem #1
  - ▶ Perspective requires sentience (Sundaresan and Pearson 2014; Kaiser 2017; Sundaresan 2018)
  - ▶ Hearsay does not

Pragmatic shift III

- Problem #2: cross-linguistic variation
- Pragmatic shift should be universal
- AnderBois (2014)
  - ▶ Only languages of the Pacific Northwest have committal hearsay
  - ▶ Such languages lack pragmatic shift altogether
- Explanation doesn't work
  - ▶ Gitksan has non-literal language (Peterson 2010)
  - ▶ Obligatory commitment with hearsay is more widespread (Finnish, Turkish)

Pragmatic shift IV

1. account for optional commitment with hearsay   ✓
2. allow obligatory commitment with hearsay   ☹
→ failure to predict the variation
3. explain the systematic gap   ✓

Proposal: the upshot

- Optionality of commitment in the evidential domain reflects a more general distinction that cross-cuts the grammar:
  - ▸ The divide between mental attitudes and speech reports

Proposal about commitment I

Status of commitment to p

The communicative vs. doxastic divide

- Private mental states about p require commitment to $p/\square p/\diamond p$ on part of the attitude holder

(14) # I infer / think / conclude that it was raining, but I don't believe it was raining.

- Reporting a previous discourse move does not (but may) require such commitment:

(15) ✓ I was told / I read / Jane says that it was raining but I don't believe it.

Proposal about commitment II

The pattern in the evidential domain is of the same nature

- Non-hearsay evidentials denote private mental states (perception, reasoning, inference) and thus require commitment to *p*
- Hearsay evidentials additionally make reference to discourse moves (they also have a mental state component; Korotkova 2016a,b, 2019b)

NB this is not to say that speech reports with evidentials and with communicative predicates always behave the same (cf. Bary and Maier 2018)

Status of the commitment inference I

1. Optional commitment with hearsay is a relevance implicature
2. Obligatory commitment with non-hearsay is an entailment

Status of the commitment inference II

- **Optional commitment with hearsay**: a relevance implicature
- Evidentials
  - common analysis as lexical triggers of not-at-issue meaning (Murray 2017)
  - Instead: evidence is typically backgrounded for pragmatic reasons, but can become foregrounded (Korotkova 2019a)
- Non-commitment is when evidence may become relevant
- Epistemic commitments are known to be expressed via implicatures; cf. ignorance effects with modal indefinites (Kratzer and Shimoyama 2002; Alonso-Ovalle and Menéndez-Benito 2010)

Obligatory commitment with non-hearsay

- Crucial property
  - ▶ commitment is not cancellable in root and attitude environments alike
- Proposal
  - ▶ expressions dealing with private mental states entail commitment
- Sanity check with English attitude verbs:

(16) a. Jane concluded that Los Angeles is the capital of California.
    ⇝ Jane believes that LA is the capital.

   b. Jane did not conclude that Los Angeles is the capital of California.
    ↝̸ Jane believes that LA is the capital.
    NB: *conclude* is not a neg-raising verb

Obligatory commitment with hearsay

- Several languages require commitment with hearsay evidentials: Finnish, Gitksan, Lilloet Salish, Turkish
- Commitment required in root and attitude clauses
- Obligatory commitment is an entailment
- Source of variation between different hearsay evidentials: the lexicon
- Parallel: entailment about the truth of the complement can be present with speech predicates, albeit rare (English *be right*)
- *Be right*: entailment about the truth of the predicate is foregrounded and such predicates are veridical

(17) a. Mary **is right** that Riga is in Latvia.
          → Riga is in Latvia.

      b. It is not the case that Mary **is right** that Riga is in Latvia.
          ↛ Riga is in Latvia.

Overall proposal

- The language describing discourse moves differs from the language describing mental attitudes
- Mental attitudes always require commitment
- Discourse moves may imply commitment
- Language- and construction-specific constraints may override the defaults

Bottom line

1. account for optional commitment with hearsay ✓
2. allow obligatory commitment with hearsay ✓
3. explain the systematic gap ✓

Wrap–up

PHENOMENON	TOOL
referential opacity and transparency	quantificational ambiguity (Russell 1905, Quine 1956)
obligatory *de se*	centered worlds (Lewis 1979, Chierchia 1989)
pure quotation	proper name (Quine 1940)
	description (Geach 1957)
	disquotation (Pagin and Westerstahl 2010)
direct discourse	multidimensional composition of quote (Potts 2007)

A recap II

PHENOMENON	TOOL
mixed quotation	deferential reference (Recanati 2001)
	unquotation (Maier 2014)
FID	bicontextualism (Banfield 1982, Doron 1991)
	generalized SOT (Sharvit 2008)
indexical shift	monstrous context shift (Schlenker 2003, Anand and Nevins 2004)
speech acts	public commitment (Condoravdi and Lauer 2017)
	conversational scoreboards (Farkas and Bruce 2010)

Thank you!

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